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PART ONE

RATIONALITY, MARKETS,
AND INSTITUTIONS

Subs:idi:ary awareness and focal awareness are mutually exclusive. If a pianist shifts
hisatt,entmn from the piece he is playing to the observation of what he is doing with
fingers while playing it, he gets confused and may have to stop. This happens
.•~.••. ••. ~eller;auy ifwe shift our focal attention to particulars of which we had previously been
•••· > '".,,.r.. only in their subsidiary role .... The arts of doing and knowing, the valuation
and the understanding of meanings, are ... only different aspects of extending our
·····-···-··into the subsidiary awareness of particulars which compose the whole.
Polanyi (1962, pp. 56, 65)
0'

no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of
in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves would
a like situation.
Smith ( 1759; 1982, p. 9)

""'~ ... ,,....."........

division of labor ... is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which
and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necesthough very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human
which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter,
exchange one thing for another.... It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love,
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
Smith (1776; 1981, pp. 25-7)
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-~·~~.- ..,r discovery is notoriously guided by many unidentified clues, and so is
to an important extent our ultimate decision of accepting the claims of a scientific
discovery as valid.
Polanyi ( 1969, p. 184)

Exchange in Social and Economic Order
Historically, a recurrent theme in economics is that the values to which people respond are not confined to those one would expect based on the narrowly defined canons of rationality. These roots go back to Adam Smith, who
examined the moral sympathies that characterize natural human sociality in
The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the causal foundations of human economic welfare in The Wealth of Nations. Economists are largely untouched
by Smith's first great work, which was eclipsed by The Wealth of Nations.
It is telling that one of the economic profession's most highly respected
historians of economic thought «found these two works in some measure
basically inconsistent" (Viner, 1991, p. 250). But Viner's interpretation has
been corrected by many reexaminations of Smith's work (see, for example,
Montes, 2003; Meardon and Ortmann, 1996; Smith 1998).
These two works are not inconsistent if we recognize that a universal
propensity for social exchange is a fundamental distinguishing feature of
Homo sapiens, and that it finds expression in two distinct forms: personal exchange in small-group social transactions, and impersonal trade
through markets. Thus, Smith was to some extent relying on one behavioral axiom, "the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for
another," where the objects of trade are interpreted to include not only commercia! goods and services but also gifts, assistance, and reciprocal favors
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out of sympathy, as "Kindness is the parent ofkindness" (Smith, 1759/1
p. 225). By interpreting personal local interactions and market .._..H.... ~-·- · •
as different expressions of the universal human propensity for engaging
exchange, we bring a unity of meaning to otherwise apparently rr.,...... __ _..
tory forms of behavior. Smith's treatment of sympathy includes the
idea of "mind reading," and is remarkably insightful and penetrating.
can be seen in the ethnographic record, daily life, and laboratory
ments, whether it is goods or favors that are exchanged, they bestow
from trade that humans seek relentlessly in all social interactions. Th
Smith's single axiom, broadly interpreted to include the social exchange
goods and favors across time, as well as the simultaneous trade of
for money or other goods, is sufficient to characterize a major portion
the human social and cultural enterprise. It explains why human
as expressed in behavior appears to be simultaneously self-regarding
other-regarding without recourse to an arbitrary expansion in the
ments of individual utility functions. It may also provide an uncteJ~stamdim,
of the origin and ultimate foundation of human rights to act - ··n.-."""'''".,,
rights."
What is traditionally called a ''property right" is a guarantee
actions to be chosen within the guidelines defined by the right. We
matically look to the state as the guarantor against reprisal when rights
exercised, but we also know that the state can often be as much a part of
problem of human rights violation as its solution. Who is to monitor
monitor? But property rights predate nation-states. This is because
exchange within stateless tribes, and trade between such tribes, predate the
agricultural revolution a mere eleven to twelve thousand years ago -little
more than an eye blink in the time scale for the emergence of humanity,
and less than 10 percent of the period since the emergence of our imme.:.
diate Homo sapiens ancestors. Both social exchange and trade implicitly
recognize mutual consensual rights to act, which are conveyed in what we
commonly refer to as "property rights."
In what sense are such rights "natural" or emergent? The answer, I think,
is to be found in the universality, spontaneity, and evolutionary fitness value
of reciprocity in social exchange. Reciprocity in human nature- and promi~
nently in our closest primate relative, the chimpanzee, but also in other
animals (de Waal, 1989, 1997, 2005) -is the foundation of our uniqueness as creatures of social exchange, which we extended to include trade
with non-kin and nontribal members long- perhaps very long- before we
adopted herder and farmer life styles.
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n~t.ssc•m<~tunes juxtapose property rights and ''human rights"
phenomena. But "property" is that over which an
or association of humans, exercises some specified
with respect to other humans. Only humans (and per,.~.- auuu~~ species, notably chimps), but not property, can be
to act without reprisal from others. The emotional
''human rights, not property rights," appears to stem
an egalitarian ethic that seeks to dispossess those who
Yet the essence of property rights is the right to the prodand to- the further productive yield generated by the
product.
mean that ( 1) if I plant corn, I have the right to harvest
corn~ and therefore the right to prevent passersby from
(2) ifi save some of the income from the sale of that harmore land, then I have the right to plant and harvest from
d. To be "propertied'' is to have the right to accumulate.
not to consume all that my labor and previous savings
produced. This allows all my accumulation to remain at
large and for all others to benefit from my capital investbasis for all endogenously sustainable (that is, devoid of
transfers) net wealth accumulation in society. There can
If there is any abridgement of an individuars rights to so
tC<:lUffitUl<:lte, then there is a direct abridgement of the rights of
in these external benefits and achieve a corresponding
in their welfare - benefits unintended by the investor-saver

~:ll 1t.tn1jer·stc,oa that c;onsumption by the rich has an insignificant
,. ..,.•.•.,..+~ ..., of the poor, because most of the income of the rich is
tools and knowledge of production (or "improvements")
.,;c;,;.:.V+•"..'""'' benefits for every consumer: "The rich only select
is most precious and agreeable ... though they mean
ri converlietlCV ... [and]· ... the gratification of their own vain
~Ie·<:tesires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their
(Smith, 1759/1982, p. 184).
one of the reasons why, as Bernard Mandeville (see
tnt! Se<:ttcm) humorously tells us that "the very Poor Liv'd better
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'(Property rights" in this sense are essential to self-sustaining
development and the reduction of poverty. Self-sustaining
poverty must depend not on enforced redistribution of the
individual effort, but in finding the means of empowering and
the self development of the skills and knowledge that allow every
ual to discover and obtain compensation for the products and
enables him or her to deliver value to others through exchange.
ment in this sense has significant positive psychologicalnn.rtPT"ntr•"
which giving has been accompanied by the pride of receiving that
escape from a residual sense of one-way dependence that can
exchange relationship.

r&>rlnrf-<A.,

Lessons from Scotland
Contrary to the outpouring of vulgar representations, in Smith's view,
individual defined and pursued his own interest in his own way, and
form of "individualism" has been mischaracterized by the metaphor
selfish "economic man" (cf. Hayek, 1976; 1991, p. 120). This unJtust:ort~cal<
scholarship fails to recognize the key proposition articulated by the ;,c(n:nsn"'
philosophers: To do good for others does not require deliberate action
further the perceived interest of others. As Mandeville so succinctly
it, <<The worst of all the multitude did something for the common good"
(Mandeville, 1705/2005, Oxford edition, pp. 17-37). 1 Smith correctly and
perceptively saw a much richer tapestry in human sociality than the vanity
and hypocrisy satirically exposed by Mandeville. But there was incredible
insight in Mandeville, whose idea that unintended good for others could
flow from doing well for yourself, as well as that the division oflabor
as an engine of wealth creation, influenced those who followed, including
Smith, who might have conceded Mandeville greater poetic license. It is nQt
evident that Smith had much of a sense of humor, at least not Mandeville'
Thus, we have the observation concerning Smith that:
He was the most absent man in company that I ever saw.... Moving his Lips
talking to himself, and Smiling, in the midst of large Companys. If you
him from his reverie, and made him attend to the Subject of Conversation,
immediately began a Harangue and never stop'd till he told you all he knew
1

This is not to suggest that Smith was in agreement with Mandeville, whose systemcalled it "pernicious" - satirically derived all acts of virtue from human vanity. See
1759/1982, section VII.ii.4, p. 313, for his critique of Mandeville and his qualification.
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ost philosophical ingenuity. He knew nothing of characters (from
h tm
teu
.
h
)2
,, A!ttOOJUlU'"L Carlyle, Autobiography, quoted m Buc an, 2004, p. 134 .

( 1705; 2005) influential and brilliant satire 3 deserves a longer
since he articulated a pre-Smithian statement (by fifty- four years)

lllfsvedail<WtJton and gains from trade:
> A, spaCI<Ju:; Hive well stockt with Bees,
in Luxury and Ease, .. ·
Numr:•ers throng'd the fruitful Hive;
h n adds the comment that, "The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, when it appeared in April
;; ashowed precisely what Smith had been up to during his reveries. Never was there a
9
1

13

; fascinated observer of his own mental state, and of the curiosities and customs of a
mor
· 1ed to h'1s much more popu1ar, but m
· s1gm
· 'fi cant
ovincial society." Further, such revenes
p~ys less penetrating work, The Wealth of Nations in 1776. (Smith, judging from Carlyle's
:Ccount, may have had some of the earmarks of high-functioning autism or Asperger's
conceptions of virtue: ascetic transcendence of the corofhuman nature and dispassionate reason that eschewed all emotional impulse.
is no such virtue; no actions based on emotionless reason or that are
.u~;;~;; u.~..•u• J""' .• ~ .. selfishnes;s. Private vices yield public virtues. The original poem appeared
in 1705 as a pamphlet, became an underground classic that was severely criticized, and
was republished in 1714 with a prose explanation and defense, and again in 1723 along
with two other essays by Mandeville. It was reprinted many times in the next century, and
translated into French and German. Of particular interest for the themes of this book, in
the preface to the 1714 edition, Mandeville significantly and meaningfully recognizes an
inherent conflict of perception between our personal social exchange characteristics and
the invisible benefits that human behavior generates through the external order of markets,
for he explains to his humorless critics:
... the main Design of the Fable ... is to shew the Impossibility of enjoying all the most
elegant Comforts of Life that are to be met with in an industrious, wealthy and powerful
Nation, and at the same time be bless'd with all the Virtue and Innocence that can be wish'd
for in a Golden Age; from thence to expose the Unreasonableness and Folly of those, that
of being an opulent and flourishing People, and wonderfully greedy after all the
as such, are yet always murmuring at and exclaiming against those
Vices and Inconveniences, that from the Beginning of the World to this present Day, have
inseparable from all Kingdoms and States that ever were fam'd for Strength, Riches,
and Politeness, at the same time ... why I have done all this, cui bono? and what Good these
will produce? truly, besides the Reader's Diversion, I believe none at all; but if I
ask'd, what Naturally ought to be expected from 'em, I wou'd answer, That in the first
People, who continually find fault with others, by reading them, would be taught
to look at home, and examining their own Consciences, be made asham' d of always railing
they are more or less guilty of themselves; and that in the next, those who are so
and Comforts, and reap all the Benefits that are the Consequence of a great
flourishing Nation, would learn more patiently to submit to those Inconveniences,
Government upon Earth can remedy, when they should see the Impossibility of
share of the first, without partaking likewise of the latter" (Mandeville,
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Yet those vast Numbers made 'em thrive,
Millions endeavoring to supply
Each other's Lust and Vanity ...
Some with vast Stocks and little Pains
Jump'd into Business of great Gains ...
And all those, that in Emnity,
With downright Working, cunningly
Convert to their own Use the Labour
Of their good-natur'd heedless Neigbour.
These were call'd Knaves, but bar the Name,
The grave Industrious were the same;
All Trades and Places knew some Cheat,
No Calling was without Deceit ...
Thus every Part was full of Vice,
Yet the whole Mass a Paradise; ...
Such were the Blessings of that State;
Their Crimes conspir'd to make them Great;
And Virtue, who from Politicks
Had learn'd a Thousand Cunning Tricks,
Was, by their happy Influence,
Made Friends with Vice: And ever since,
The worst of all the Multitude
Did something for the Common Good ...
Thus Vice nurs'd Ingenuity,
Which join'd with Time and Industry,
Had carry'd Life's Conveniences,
It's reap Pleasures, Comforts, Ease,
To such a Height, the very Poor
Liv'd better than the Rich Before,
And nothing could be added more ...
Without great Vices, is a vain
EUTOPIA seated in the brain,
Fraud, Luxury and Pride must live,
While we the benefits receive ...
Bare Virtue can't make Nations live
In Splendor; they, that would revive
A Golden Age, must be as free,
For Acorns as for Honesty.

Many contemporary scholars and not only popular writers have
Mandeville's (and Smith's wealth-of-nations') proposition, and
the standard socioeconomic science model (hereafter, the SSSM; see
mides and Too by, 1992) requires, justifies, and promotes selfish b
That A implies B in no sense allows the reverse statement. But why
people, including economists, confuse necessary with sufficient LvJ"lULU"-''
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is provided in this book's title text quotation from Hume: No
consistently apply rational logical principles to everything he or she
As theorists, we live by proving theorems, and when in this mode
make such errors. If perchance we slip, another will be quick to
!iihts can never cover every margin of decision, then notion that markets depend on selfishness, and to the
Mandeville - opportunism in all relational contracting
across time are costs, not benefits, in achieving long-term
an ideology of honesty> means that people play the
rather than ''steal,, although crime may frequently pay
•""•"h,t<P~I<Pr who routinely chooses dominant strategies. Nor
behavior in conjunction and parallel with ordinary market
those transactions from promoting specialization and
There is no inherent contradiction between self-regarding
behavior, and as we shall see, the latter well serves
under the common cultural norms of reciprocity sharing
repeat interaction - other-regarding behavior does not
ter-teR:ardmg utility.
that have evolved markets have enormously expanded resource
created commensurate gains from exchange, and are wealththose that have not (see Scully, 1988; Demmert and Klein, 2003;
and Lawson, 2003; and the numerous references they contain).
proposition says nothing about the necessity of human selfishness for
.attam:mt~nt of economic betterment - the increased wealth of partieindividuals can be used by them for consumption and investment;
oftaxes; Macarthur Fellows; and gifts to the symphony, the Smithor the poor. Markets economize on the need for virtue, but do
.eumu'1ate it and indeed depend on it to avoid a crushing burden of
~.U<VUlHjO, and enforcement cost. If every explicit or implicit contract
external policing resources to ensure efficient performance, the
gains from specialization and exchange would be in danger of
g gobbled up by these support costs. In this sense, the informal propright rules or norms of moral social engagement - thou shalt not
bear false witness, commit adultery, or covet the possessions
I,.J.a1u"'"'u'J"'

powers of analysis fall short even at our best. A missing chapter in the study ofbounded
lat.ronatlity is its application to understanding and accepting with a little humility the severe
·!ffii.ltations it imposes on our own professional development of economic theory.
(1990; 2005) has emphasized the importance of ideology in promoting economic
by lowering transactions and enforcement costs.
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of thy neighbor - strongly support wealth creation through the ·
specialization made possible by personal social exchange and the
order of markets.
Research in economic psychology6 has prominently reported
where "fairness" and other considerations are said to contradict the
nality assumptions of the SSSM. But experimental economists have
mixed results on subject conformance with "rational models." In
gains for themselves and others, people often are better, in rn.-. ...........-~---"
with, or worse than constructive rational analysis predicts:
• Better in many two-person anonymous interactions (see Part III)
• As predicted in rapidly convergent repetitive-flow supply-andmarkets (see Part II)
• Worse in certain asset-trading markets, although these still slowly
verge in time (Smith et al., 1988; Porter and Smith, 1994)
6
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I will use the term "economic psychology" generally to refer to cognitive psychology
has been applied to economic questions, and to a third subfield of experimental
in economics recently product-differentiated as "behavioral economics" (Mulhtin~ttl
and Thaler, 2001), and further differentiated into "behavioral game theory" (
2003). The original foundations were laid by Ward Edwards, Daniel Kahneman,
tol Rappoport, Sidney Siegel, Paul Slavic, and Amos Tversky, to name only a few
most prominent. Behavioral economists have made a cottage industry of showing
the SSSM assumptions seem to apply almost nowhere to decisions, hypothetical or
This is because their research program has been a candidly deliberate search for
tifying the ways in which behavior differs from the standard model ... " (Mt:tllai.natb~
and Thaler, 2001, p. 2), a search in what may be the tails of distributions. Lopes (
in a survey of the judgment and decision literature, suggests that it was after 1
the search for anomalies becomes evident. Others who have searched more rr...-....·<•11''
the distributions of behavior relative to model predictions have found both
and confirmations; in some cases, the differences were accounted for by improved
ment or by refining the theory; in some cases the confirmations were not robust, in
quite robust; in still other cases the behavior could be said to be more "rational" than
models that were tested. Although this book is critical of much of standard theory
its conceptual foundations, it reports cases that both differ and are congruent with
traditional models. Even in the latter case there is usually plenty of room for ·
understanding and in getting the details and dynamics right. I would wish that
find solutions, not just fault, as there is more than enough of the latter to go
Weber and Camerer (2006, p. 187) have sought to correct the "searching for
methodological stance of behavioral economics with a new definition based on" ...
evidence and constructs from neighboring social sciences .... " Experimental
from its inception has been importantly interdisciplinary and influenced by exr>erimen1
psychologists, as is plain in the references in this book. It has long focused on
group, but also rule-governed (institutional) behavior. Behavioral economics is
about new and fundamental foundations, but about the particular questions and
emphasized.
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in these contradictions and confirmations can provide importo the implicit rules or norms that people may follow, and can
ues ew theoretical hypotheses for examination in both the field and
n
The pattern of results greatly modifies the prevailing and misrational SSSM, and richly modernizes the unadulterated message of
C'-'"·*+"'n

philosophers.

